Background - Account of Events 3
Having completed the installation of machinery, tooling and materials at the production space of AML, all was in place for start of operations of the new company. Two managers were appointed to run each of the aforementioned business units. A former employee of the armoury was appointed as manager (gérant) of AML commercial division while Täuschkörper division was managed by a specialist in countermeasures technology and aerospace engineering.
Regarding operations in terms of milestones, one could distinguish the following:
1- The Prolific period: throughout 2005 until November of the same year. AML exported tens of thousands of countermeasures and fulfilled orders with great success. New customers were appearing and contracts with existing and new ones were being negotiated.
2- The Banana Republic incident: September to November 2005. Around this time, (as it was later established by investigations, intelligence reports and other sources), a massive blow was being prepared by a powerful mechanism in the background.
Penetration by AML countermeasures into crucial markets, especially in the Far East and Middle East attracted the attention of at least one country, the industry of which experienced their traditional customers walk away due to AML offering competitive pricing and shorter delivery.
Consequently, pressure began to be exerted to the GDL regime by means of diplomatic contacts in both countries capitals. AML was bluntly accused of unlicensed copying of technology, harming national interests, illegal activities, etc. The GDL regime bowed to the pressure and accepted the accusations without ever seeking to invite AML officers for the views and explanations of the "altera pars". This became obvious by events which followed shortly after.
3- The Stalinist Republic period: November 2005 to July 2006. The premises of AML were raided by the "anti-terrorist cell" on 22 November 2005. The raid was later reported to have been triggered by the allegedly illegal activities of the former owner of AML who had been arrested.
Following the raid, seals (Scelle) were placed on the entrances of AML. Three charges were brought against the manager of the commercial division. These charges, analytically stated in the report of the officer in charge of the raid, concerned the following violations of the law : (i) failure to maintain a Registry (book of arms), (ii) illicit modification of markings on a firearm exported to another country (iii) illicit export of components of an arm to another country.
The manager of the commercial division was punished with administrative measures: Withdrawal of trading license and withdrawal of arms license. No criminal charges were brought forward. An appeal to revoke the decision was answered by the regime with three additional charges, this time involving the countermeasures division, the real target. The three additional charges centered around a single keyword: Munitions !!
Regardless of the fact that during previous months it was clearly known that countermeasures were locally assembled and were permitted to be exported, the latter were conveniently labelled as munitions. This was in blunt violation of the regime's own legislation of 1983 (*).
The assembly of countermeasures was labeled as illegal munitions manufacture, the transport to cargo terminal as illegal transport of munitions and the storage of the raw materials (magnesium, teflon, aluminium powders) as illicit stockage of dangerous materials. Hundreds of kg of gun powder and half a million of small calibre ammunition which were stored for years at the bunkers of the premises and regularly sold by AML were of no concern !!